Introduction
Economic inequality has increased over time in many industrialised societies (Heathcote, Perri, & Violante, 2010; Neckerman & Torche, 2007) . Scholars agree that the level of income inequality in the USA and traditionally egalitarian countries such as Denmark and Sweden has increased in the past 40 years (McCall & Percheski, 2010; OECD, 2011) . In nonWestern areas, including Asia and the Pacific, a rising trend of economic inequality has also been observed (Kanbur, Rhee, & Zhuang, 2014; Wang, Wan, and Yang, 2014) . For example, in the 1980s, the average disposable income of the richest 10% in OECD countries was approximately seven times higher than that of the poorest 10%; more recent figures place it at nine times higher (Keeley, 2015) .
Economic inequality is a fundamental social problem because economic inequality often correlates with various social domains of inequality (Dorling & Dorling, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012) . Economic inequality has been found to be associated with disparities in happiness, health, education, crime and more (Neckerman & Torche, 2007; Neumayer & Pl€ umper, 2016) . Moreover, economic inequality persists from generation to generation. Economic inequality in an older generation often results in unequal educational opportunities or discrepant academic achievements in the younger generation (Corak, 2013; Rumberger, 2010) . Problems related to economic and social inequality can no longer be treated as negligible on the pretext of maximising economic growth (Grusky & Szel enyi, 2007) . A key solution to mitigate rising inequality might be the development of government redistributive policies and programmes, such as public assistance or unemployment insurance (Stiglitz, 2012) .
The fundamental question is, 'What leads a state to be actively involved in redistributive income policies in order to reduce inequality?' Politicians in democratic societies tend to pursue policy preferences depending on the demands of their constituents. Accordingly, public support for egalitarian policies is an important force in advancing redistributive policies. Widely shared perceptions of inequality are expected to encourage public support for government intervention. Previous research suggests that people who perceive that societies are unfair are more likely to support government redistribution (e.g., Corneo & Gr€ uner, 2002; Fong, 2001 ). Page and Jacobs (2009) explained that people support government programmes to decrease economic inequality because they understand economic inequality's threatening effects. In addition to perceived economic inequality, beliefs concerning inequality of opportunity for upward mobility are associated with attitudes in favour of redistribution (Alesina & Giuliano, 2011) . Much of the existing research on the relationships between perceived inequality and attitudes towards redistribution focuses on European countries and the USA. Comparative empirical studies on this topic in the context of East Asia are scarce.
To address this knowledge gap, the current study focused on mainland China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, seeking to answer two questions: (i) What do people really think about economic inequality, inequality of opportunity and the role of government in mitigating problems related to inequality in mainland China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan? (ii) How are people's perceptions regarding economic inequality and inequality of opportunity associated with their attitudes towards government redistribution policies in these countries? Welfare states in East Asia share common traits, such as Confucianism as a distinct development ideology (Jones, 1990) , a strong emphasis on economic growth (Holliday, 2000) and a conservative political ideology shared by political elites who governed the early development of the welfare state (Aspalter, 2001) . There is some degree of unity within East Asian welfare states; however, the logic behind the welfare development in East Asia is complex (Aspalter, 2006) . In the developed economies of East Asia, economic and social inequality has increased over time as a result of industrial development. How to address the problem of increasing inequality and how to respond to the needs of individuals may be essential for the next developmental stage in welfare states and the attainment of sustainable social development. Our findings on these research questions contribute to advancing knowledge about the development of welfare state systems within an East Asian context.
Literature review

Perceptions of inequality and attitudes towards redistribution
Inequality exists in various forms and individuals perceive inequality differently. Perceptions of inequality can be understood in terms of two broad aspects: (i) perceived inequality of outcomes; (ii) perceived inequality of opportunity. Perceived economic inequality can be conceptualised as an individual's perceptions of how society distributes economic properties, including income and wealth, across social members relative to what characterises an equal society. Perceived inequality of opportunity refers to an individual's perceptions of the differences between how the system should work and how the system actually works. Bryan Turner (1986) referred to different types of equality, including equality of opportunity (i.e., the idea that access to valued ends is open to all) and equality of outcomes (cited in Hurst, Gibbon, & Nurse, 2016) . Along the same line, Dorling and Dorling (2011) stated that economic inequality results from injustice, which explains the interdependency of different forms of inequality. In discussing the distinction between inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity, Kanbur et al. (2014) explained inequality of opportunity as 'the portion of the inequality of outcome that can be attributed to differences in individual circumstances'. Circumstances refer to those features that are outside the control of the individual, such as ethnicity, gender, place of origin and family background (de Barros, Ferreira, Vega, & Chanduvi, 2009; Kanbur et al., 2014) . Given an individual's circumstances, individual effort in education and in the labour market will change his or her outcomes. However, in many countries there are many circumstances that limit opportunities for a large segment of the population (Kanbur et al., 2014) . Empirical evidence suggests that individuals in Asia treat these two types of inequality (inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity) differently (Kanbur et al., 2014) . For example, a study by the Asian Development Bank reported that about 60% of the respondents in Asia agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that it is more important to reduce inequality of opportunity than to reduce inequality of income (Asian Development Bank, 2012) .
The question remains as to how individuals' perceived inequality of income and perceived inequality of opportunity are associated with attitudes towards redistribution in the context of East Asia. Previously, scholars have focused, not on individual perceptions, but rather on macro levels of socioeconomic inequality, and have sought to understand the relationship between socioeconomic inequality and the extent of redistribution (Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005; Luebker, 2014; Lupu & Pontusson, 2011) . Meltzer and Richard (1981) , based on the standard assumption of rational choice, argued that higher economic inequality leads to greater redistribution by shaping the median voter's preferences. According to this view, individuals who expect economic advantages from the decrease of economic inequality, usually those in lower socioeconomic strata, tend to be more supportive of income redistributive policies (Corneo & Gr€ uner, 2002) . Therefore, the median voter's interest in redistribution will be greater in more unequal societies (Meltzer & Richard, 1981) . Scholars, including Gijsberts (2002) and Hadler (2005) and what the society one lives in looks like (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Kuhn, 2010; Linos & West, 2003; Pittau, Massari, & Zelli, 2012; Smyth, Mishra, & Qian, 2010) . Perceived economic inequality is strongly associated with political ideology or policy attitudes (Bartels, 2008) . According to Bartels (2008) , political and social conservatives are more likely than liberals to deny that economic inequality has increased and are less likely to develop supportive attitudes towards redistributive policies.
Other social beliefs that shape the attitudes of individuals towards redistribution are those that pertain to social fairness and justice (Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Bartels, 2008) . Previous studies have found that people who believe in the importance of non-merit-based factors in social mobility are more likely to support redistribution than are people who believe that success depends on individual effort and ability (Corneo & Gr€ uner, 2002; Fong, 2001) .
Published literature suggests that it is entirely plausible that unequal societies will redistribute more if the public perceives that the inequality is as serious as it is in more unequal societies, thus resulting in more support for redistribution. Empirical findings consistently suggest that public policy preferences are significantly associated with redistributive outcomes (Brooks & Manza, 2006; Luebker, 2014) . However, overall findings on the effects of socioeconomic inequality on government redistribution have been mixed. The mixed results regarding the relationship between inequality and redistributive outcomes may partly depend on how people perceive socioeconomic inequality and how their perceptions regarding socioeconomic inequality shape their preferences regarding redistributive policies. The association between socioeconomic inequality and public support for redistribution is not straightforward (Yanai, 2012) . Findings from opinion surveys suggest that there are cognitive impediments to strong demands for redistribution among individuals in unequal societies (Kaufman, 2009) . One of these impediments is the lack of awareness of the actual size of the gaps in wealth or the gravity of income inequality. For example, Bartels (2008) showed that the public tends to be unaware of increasing trends of economic inequality. Furthermore, cultural tolerance for inequality is likely to shape support for government redistribution (Kaufman, 2009) . Depending on such cultural beliefs, income gaps can be considered as justifiable rewards for efforts and skills, or unjustifiable exploitation from foul play. In addition, individuals' expectations about opportunities and social mobility may influence their attitudes towards redistribution (Kaufman, 2009; Steele, 2015) . Steele (2015) showed that beliefs in the existence of opportunities for advancement are significant factors contributing to attitudes towards redistribution. These factors make it unclear how socioeconomic inequality shapes people's perceptions regarding socioeconomic inequality, and ultimately, their policy preferences and voting behaviours. Although some scholars have attempted to examine the association between people's perceptions of inequality and support for government redistribution (Durante, Putterman, & Weele, 2014; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008) , few studies have examined this topic using data from four East Asian states in a comparative manner.
Perceived economic inequality, perceived inequality of opportunity and attitudes towards redistribution in four East Asian states
It is well known that social contexts, such as welfare regimes and social policies, are associated with attitudes towards redistribution (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Jakobsen, 2011; Jaeger, 2009; Svallfors, 1997) . The following section discusses the social contexts of mainland China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, focusing on economic and social inequality and welfare state characteristics.
Mainland China. The economic reforms of post-1978 mainland China commodified economies. As a result, mainland China's economy grew quickly, becoming one of the world's largest economies. At the same time, mainland China has been experiencing rapid social changes, including the transformation of socioeconomic stratification and the evolution of complex social class systems. The rigid status hierarchy of traditional China has developed into a more open class system of modernity (Bian, 2002) . In rural areas, different classes have emerged, including 'rural cadres', 'private entrepreneurs', 'managers of township and village enterprises', 'wage labour in local private sector', 'peasants who live on income from agricultural products', and more (Bian, 2002, p. 95) . Urban employees, who had enjoyed benefits and services provided by urban work organisations through to the end of the 1970s (Feng, 2011) , experienced massive layoffs and the organised transfer of state-sector workers in the 1990s (Bian, 2002) . There have been significant changes in social policies, as well. According to Wong (2004, p. 159 
. . . there has been a paradigm shift in China's welfare regime. The right to work and the ubiquity of public goods underlay a collectivist and rightsbased approach to life support. Under the onslaught of markets, however, a less statist and more pluralist approach made its debut, resulting in an individualisation of social rights.
The concepts of self-direction and earned income have become more important, and dependency on the state for welfare is no longer regarded as irresponsible (Wong, 2004) . These rapid reforms and socioeconomic changes brought new challenges to modern mainland China, including socioeconomic inequality (Wang, Shi, & Zheng, 2002) .
In 1980, the Gini coefficient was around 0.31; in 2012 the measure rose to 0.47 (Shi, 2017) . Inequality patterns in mainland China are multifaceted (Gallagher & Hanson, 2009 ). The main causes of rising inequality include increases in inequality among urban households and widening urban-rural income gaps (Cao & Nee, 2007; Li & Luo, 2008) . Some scholars and policymakers view this rising inequality as a trade-off with economic growth, and expect that inequality will decline at a certain point. Others view inequality as a serious social problem (Cao & Nee, 2007) . Regardless, rising inequality has become a challenging problem for the government (Gallagher & Hanson, 2009) . Public opinion about inequality has changed over time, and citizens have become less tolerant of income inequality. Wong (2004, p. 166) stated that:
. . . popular attitudes have hardened when income polarization becomes too stark. In particular, cadres, managers and bosses who flaunt their opulence while many workers go unpaid become the target of wrath, more so because people suspect foul play and unfair advantages as the real causes of wealth.
It seems clear that, in mainland China, more people have become aware of the problem of income inequality and inequality of opportunity. Consequently, they are more supportive of public welfare programmes.
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are distinct from mainland China in terms of their social and economic context, including welfare state characteristics. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are regarded as typical examples of the East Asian welfare regime (Shi, 2012) . Traditionally based on Confucianism, family serves is an irreplaceable part of the welfare system in each of these states (Jones, 1990) . Another key factor shaping the East Asian welfare model is rapid economic development. Holliday (2000) argued that social policies have served as a means to support economic growth and political stability in East Asian welfare states. Government emphasis on economic growth and industrialization has resulted in 'reluctant welfarism' (Midgley, 1986) . In the early stage of welfare state development in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, social insurance schemes, primarily covering core industrial workers and civil servants, were central (Kwon, 2009 ). In addition, a heavy reliance on company-based welfare was characteristic of the early East Asian welfare states (Feng, 2011; Park, 2007) .
As a result, only selected groups of people had access to social protection; therefore, social welfare policies were not effective in ameliorating inequality (Kwon, 2005) . However, these benefits declined with the growth in labour market flexibility since the economic crisis.
Taiwan. In Taiwan, income inequality has risen over the course of the country's economic development, especially after 1980. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.28 in 1980 to 0.34 in 2004 (Lee, 2008) . The leading factor in this rising economic inequality is structural changes in the family (Lee, 2008) . As a result of higher divorce rates and lower marriage rates, the number of single parents has increased. Single-parent households are more likely to experience economic hardship than households with dual incomes (Lee, 2008) . The risk of poverty among single-parent households may contribute to the increasing trend of economic inequality. Public welfare programmes have been developed to reduce economic inequality. The transition to a political democracy during the 1990s and the competition of different political parties for public support provided the foundation for the expansion of welfare (Shi, 2012) . One of the 1990s-era policy expansions was the introduction of universal national health insurance in 1995 (Wong, 2004) . This welfare expansion, however, was not successful in significantly relieving economic inequality. Ongoing changes in the economic structure of modern Taiwan are another contributing factor in the rising economic inequality. Structural unemployment as a result of post-industrialisation, the economic recession of the early 2000s, and the trend towards flexibilisation of the labour market have widened the income gap (Shi, 2012) . In the new millennium, welfare policies have been developed to deal with challenges resulting from the changing nature of family structure and labour markets (Shi, 2012) .
Japan. Japan achieved strong economic growth and suppressed income inequality relatively well until the late 1980s (Tachibanaki, 2006) . Japan had a fully developed welfare state composed of a large number of social insurance schemes as the pillars of the social security system, as well as various other programmes (Jacobs, 1998) . Indeed, between the 1960s and 1970s, an equitable distribution of household incomes emerged, along with a period of high economic growth. The Gini coefficient declined from 0.45 in the beginning of the 1960s to below 0.40 by the late 1970s, until it reached 0.34 in 1982 (Feng, 2011) . During this time, it was believed that individual effort, not social origin, was decisive in determining social status in Japanese society (Chiavacci, . Since the bubble economy in the late 1980s through the early 1990s, however, income inequality has increased rapidly, and the Gini coefficient was recorded at 0.38 in 1999 (Tachibanaki, 2006) . The main contributing factors of rising income inequality in Japan have been found to be the aging population (Ohtake & Saito, 1998) , changes in household structure, and increasing unemployment rates among young people (Takanami, 2010) . In addition, the Japanese social security system does not generate sufficient vertical redistribution (Jacobs, 2000) . Fujimura (2000) explained that Japan has experienced two stages of development in social welfare. During the first stage, from the end of the 1970s through the early 1980s, the intervention of the state was residual. The second stage, in the 1990s, was characterised by 'government failure' and the emergence of welfare pluralism. In a system of welfare pluralism, horizontal redistribution within a particular class tends to predominate rather than vertical redistribution (Fujimura, 2000) . While survey opinions indicate that most Japanese people perceive society to be impartial (Takegawa, 2013) , government intervention regarding inequality is limited in a welfare pluralism system. Although Japan had implemented welfare reform, its policies are a response to economic recession and an aging population, not economic inequality (Kwon, 2009) . Consequently, the middle class has gradually come to enjoy substantial benefits through welfare services (Fujimura, 2000) .
South Korea. In South Korea, 'compact growth' took place between 1969 and 1989, and per capita income quadrupled from $2,000 to $8,000. Over the next 15 years, per capita income doubled again, reaching $16,000 by 2003 (Feng, 2011) . Despite rapid economic growth, Korea remained a relatively equal society until the late 1990s (Koo, 2007) . Feng (2011) described it as the phenomenon of 'growth with equity'. Regardless of economic growth and relatively equal social strata, the lack of democratic political systems led to a massive democracy movement and demands for welfare. Since the late 1980s, Korea gradually increased both the level of democratisation and more inclusive welfare programmes (Park, 2007) . Following the financial crisis of 1997, however, Korea experienced unprecedented social bipolarisation and inequality (Ban, 2013; Koo, 2007; Yoo & Kim, 2003) . The Gini coefficient rose to 0.32 in 2009 from 0.28 in 1997 (Jo, 2014; Kang, 2012) . The main causes of this rising inequality have been found to be increasing unemployment rates and the flexible labour market (Jo, 2014; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) . Growing income inequality has caused the majority of Koreans to believe that Korea is severely unequal and social mobility is quite limited (Jung & Oh, 2009; Kang, 2012; Park & Suh, 2012) . Public transfer payments are still underdeveloped (Jacobs, 2000) and insufficient to alleviate the rising economic inequality (Ban, 2013; Kwon, 2009; Shin & Chang, 2010) . Prior to the welfare reform in the late 1990s, the social security system was an instrument for economic growth, and excluded the most vulnerable members of society from its safety net. Although social security coverage and benefits have expanded since the reform, the level of public expenditure on social welfare is quite low, considering Korea's economic status. As inequality has become a major social issue in recent decades, public attitudes towards the welfare state have changed to being primarily in favour of state-sponsored welfare policies (Kim & Choi, 2011) .
Knowledge gaps and research objectives
Rising inequality appears to be a common social problem in all four East Asian states. A small number of empirical studies have compared attitudes towards redistribution across East Asian states, including mainland China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Guillaud (2013) examined people's attitudes towards government redistribution across 33 countries, using data from the 2006 International Social Survey Program (ISSP). A single item was used to measure attitudes towards redistribution, asking, 'On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor?' According to Guillaud's (2013) findings (p. 62), the respective proportions of participants in the 2006 ISSP who supported government-sponsored redistribution (with responses of either 'probably should be' or 'definitely should be') were 88.86% for the Taiwanese, 80.59% for the Korean and 66.05% for the Japanese, indicating that Taiwanese and Korean people are relatively more supportive of government redistribution policies than Japanese people. Jakobsen (2011) examined welfare attitudes using data from the World Value Survey for 19 countries. In that study, Japan and South Korea appear to strongly support the government's responsibility for policies that ensure the provision of welfare for everyone. In Jakobsen's study, attitudes towards redistribution were assessed using a 10-level Likert-type question, for which high values indicate pro-welfare state attitudes among respondents. The per country means on this item were 6.83 for Japan and 6.81 for South Korea, which were the third and fourth highest out of the 19 OECD countries in terms of public levels of support for government responsibility for welfare (Jakobsen, 2011, p. 328) .
To date, relatively little attention has been paid to how attitudes towards redistribution differ across East Asian states. In addressing this gap in our understanding, the current study had two objectives. First, the study compared the extent of differences in the perceptions of economic inequality and inequality of opportunity and the attitudes towards redistribution among people across the four East Asian states. Second, the study examined the effects of inequality perceptions on people's attitudes towards redistribution from a comparative perspective.
Method
Data
This study used the 2009 ISSP data. The 2009 ISSP data were originally collected from 34 countries with the theme of social inequality. The current study used data of respondents from four East Asian countriesmainland China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Table 1 presents sample characteristics.
Measures
Perceived economic inequality was assessed by asking respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: 'Differences in income in "respondent's country" are too large'. This statement was rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from 'strongly agree' (1) to 'strongly disagree' (5). Responses were inverted so that high scores corresponded to higher levels of perceived economic inequality.
Perceived inequality of opportunity was assessed using six questions regarding the exogenous determinants of social mobility. In a just society, people believe that every individual has a chance to succeed based on individual merit, which is characterised by an individual's innate ability, high integrity and hard work (McNamee & Miller, 2009) . When people believe that success lies beyond the individual's control or efforts, they tend to perceive their society as unfair and unequal. Therefore, perceived inequality of opportunity was defined as individual perceptions of the extent a person's chances to succeed are related to ascribed characteristics, such as socioeconomic origin, race, gender and so forth. (Breen & Jonsson, 2005) . The questions determined the personal importance of the exogenous factors of ascription, discrimination and corruption, with regard to success: (i) 'How important is coming from a wealthy family?' (ii) 'How important is having well-educated parents?' (iii) 'How important is knowing the right people?' (iv) 'How important is having political connections?' (v) 'How important is giving bribes?' and (vi) 'How important is being born a man or a woman?' This series of questions about the importance of exogenous determination for advancement in society has been used by a number of scholars (e.g., Fong, 2001; Linos & West, 2003) . Respondents rated these questions on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 'Essential' (1) to 'Not important at all' (5). We inverted the responses so that higher scores corresponded to higher levels of perceived inequality of opportunity; scale scores were calculated by averaging the re-coded responses to the items.
Attitudes towards redistribution were measured by asking respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following statement: 'It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes'. Respondents rated this statement on a Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from 'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly agree' (5).
Subjective socioeconomic status (SES) was assessed with an illustration of a ladder with ten rungs. Participants were asked to indicate the ladder rung that best represented their social standing. A respondent's educational background was measured by his/her highest earned degree, and coded into six categories: (i) no formal qualification; (ii) lowest formal qualification; (iii) above lowest qualification; (iv) higher secondary completed; (v) above higher secondary level and (vi) university degree. Marital status was originally coded into six categories. This variable was dichotomised, and 'currently married' was coded as 1 and 'not currently married' was coded as 0. The urbanicity of a respondent's residential area was coded as 'urban areas' (1) and 'country areas' (0).
Analysis
The study's analysis consisted of two procedures. First, descriptive statistics on perceived economic inequality, perceived inequality of opportunity, and attitudes towards redistribution were compared across four states. Second, a series of linear regression analyses were performed to examine the effects of perceived economic inequality and inequality of opportunity on attitudes towards redistribution. Since attitudes towards redistribution were assessed using a 5-level scale, ordered logistic regression and binary logistic regression analyses were also performed. All three analytic approaches produced nearly identical results. Perceived inequality of opportunity was assessed using a scale of six 5-level Likert-type questions. Figure 2 shows mean levels of perceived inequality of opportunity among respondents in each country. Mean levels of perceived inequality of opportunity were 3.44 among mainland Chinese respondents, 3.05 among Korean respondents, 2.72 among Taiwanese respondents and 2.38 among Japanese respondents. Figure 3 shows that mean levels of attitudes towards redistribution were 3.97 among the mainland Chinese respondents, 3.92 among the Korean respondents, 3.60 among the Taiwanese respondents and 3.55 among the Japanese respondents. These results show that the mainland Chinese and Korean respondents were more likely to perceive their social systems as unfair and unjust and were more supportive of redistributive policies.
Results
The main goal of this study was to understand how individual perceptions of economic inequality and inequality of opportunity are associated with attitudes towards redistribution after accounting for the effects of sociodemographic characteristics. Table 2 presents the results of the regression analyses for attitudes towards redistribution. For the total sample, the results of the analyses reveal that perceived economic inequality and perceived inequality of opportunity were positively associated with attitudes towards redistribution. Regarding sociodemographic characteristics, subjective SES was negatively associated with attitudes towards redistribution, suggesting that an individual with a higher social status is less likely to support policies of government redistribution. Relative to mainland Chinese respondents, respondents in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were less likely to support redistributive policies.
Across all four states, the results consistently indicated that perceived economic inequality was positively associated with attitudes towards redistribution. However, perceived inequality of opportunity was a significant factor in people's attitudes towards redistribution only in mainland China and Korea (see Table 3 ). Interestingly, subjective SES was not significantly associated with attitudes towards redistribution for Korean people, but the effects of subjective SES were significant in mainland China, Japan and Taiwan. Regarding sociodemographic characteristics, age was significantly related to attitudes towards redistribution in mainland China and South Korea, but the direction of this relationship was different between the two states. In South Korea, older people were less supportive of government redistribution, whereas in mainland China, older people were more supportive of government redistribution. Education had significant effects on attitudes towards redistribution in mainland China and South Korea. In South Korea, people with higher levels of education were less supportive of government redistribution, whereas people with higher levels of education were more supportive of government redistribution in mainland China.
Discussion
This study explored the effects of perceived economic inequality and perceived inequality of opportunity on attitudes towards redistribution in four East Asian states. According to the results for the total sample, both types of perceived inequality (i.e., perceived economic inequality and perceived inequality of opportunity) were positively associated with attitudes towards redistribution. The work of Pittau et al. (2012) showed that attitudes towards redistribution are influenced by individual beliefs regarding what constitutes good policies for society as a whole. People who perceive that a society is economically and socially unfair are more likely to support government policies of income redistribution, as these people think redistributive policies will reduce the gap between how they believe a system should work and how the system actually works. The results of the present study confirm the known effects of social status and social beliefs of individuals on attitudes towards redistribution in the context of East Asian countries.
The main contribution of the present study to the knowledge base is that it empirically examined how these effects vary across mainland China, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Perceived economic inequality was found to be the only independent variable having significant effects on attitudes towards redistribution in all four countries. In these four countries, respondents indicated that they regarded income disparities in their countries as being too large. However, in the study sample, the percentages of people who agreed or strongly agreed with the idea that it is the responsibility of the government to reduce economic inequality were 79.58% in mainland China, 75.09% in South Korea, 66.31% in Taiwan and 54.36% in Japan. Thus, although people might perceive their country to be economically unequal, they do not necessarily support government polices of income redistribution. The present study found that perceived economic inequality is a key factor in explaining attitudes towards redistribution in the four East Asian countries under study.
In cases of perceived inequality of opportunity, we hypothesised that people support government redistribution when they perceive that their society does not guarantee equal opportunities for success or fair competition in various social systems. However, mainland China and South Korea were the only two states with a significant association between attitudes towards redistribution and perceived inequality of Figure 2 , mainland China and South Korea have relatively higher mean levels of perceived inequality of opportunity. The data suggest that perceived inequality of opportunity is not a significant factor in support for government redistribution in Japan and Taiwan, where people perceive their societies as relatively fair. It is difficult to explain why the effects of perceived inequality of opportunity are inconsistent across the four East Asian states. Perhaps perceptions of inequality become decisive in supporting government redistribution when a significant portion of the population perceives unequal opportunities to be a significant social problem. The current study also revealed that the effects of SES on attitudes towards redistribution vary across the four East Asian states. Perceived SES was a significant factor in attitudes towards redistribution among people in mainland China, Japan and Taiwan, but it was not a significant factor in South Korea. Previous studies on welfare attitudes among people in South Korea report that Koreans tend to believe that the government should take more responsibility for reducing income disparities, and that this belief is fairly consistent across groups with different social standings. The effects of SES on attitudes towards welfare are equivocal in Korea (Kim, 2010; Kim & Yeo, 2011) , and empirical knowledge thereof remains limited. Some studies have reported that SES does not explain attitudes towards redistribution among Koreans, and have characterised the welfare attitudes of Korean people as 'classlessness' (Ahn, 2009; Kim & Yeo, 2011; Lee & Lee, 2010; Ryu, 2004) . One explanation for the 'classlessness' in the welfare attitudes of Korean people is the welfare status theory (Ahn, 2009 ). According to this view, welfare attitudes among Koreans depend more on the welfarerelated status of individuals (i.e., status as welfare beneficiaries, welfare taxpayers, or welfare service providers) than on the perceived socioeconomic conditions of individuals (Ahn, 2009 ). Another explanation is that, in South Korea, the effects of social beliefs on attitudes towards redistribution are more dominant than the effects of people's material circumstances. According to Piketty (1995) , individuals develop different beliefs regarding the relationship between effort and outcome from their personal experiences with social mobility. These beliefs shape their opinions about optimal levels of redistribution. Many Koreans perceive society to be considerably unfair and unequal. These Koreans may strongly support redistribution policies, not only because they expect direct economic benefits from redistributive policies, but also because they believe that such policies can change society for the better. Finally, in the past half century, the Korean government has emphasised economic growth through strong government-led industrialisation. Through this process, Korean people may have grown accustomed to government intervention (Huh & Kim, 2016) . Facing high levels of economic and social inequality, the majority of Korean people appear to believe that the government should intervene to fix the current situation. However, this does rule out the possibility of the significance of SES in public support for government redistribution in South Korea. Some recent studies on welfare attitudes among Koreans report that divides in welfare attitudes across different social strata have become more significant (e.g., Huh & Kim, 2016) .
Several methodological limitations to the current study should be acknowledged. First, the findings rely on the results from a secondary data analysis. Considering that individual attitudes towards redistribution are a complex social phenomenon, several key variables were not included. For example, political party preference may be an important explanatory factor in attitudes towards redistribution, but data on political party preferences were not available for the Taiwanese sample. Second, the findings may not be applicable to the current situation in each of the states. Mainland China is experiencing rapid social changes. In addition, East Asian states experienced turbulent economic (Kwon, 2014) . The current study used the 2009 ISSP data. The ISSP collected social inequality module data in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009 . Although data collected in 2009 are somewhat outdated, the 2009 ISSP data are the only data set including all study variables and all four East Asian countries. In addition, the current study's findings can be compared with future ISSP data using the social inequality module. Such a comparison will elucidate possible changes in the public perception of inequality and attitudes towards redistribution in the four East Asian states.
In conclusion, inequality perceptions are generally significant factors of public support for government redistribution in the four East Asian states. However, in the present study, perceived inequality of opportunity was significantly associated with attitudes towards redistribution only in mainland China and South Korea, where people had relatively high levels of perceived inequality of opportunity. The results suggest that the effects of perceived inequality of opportunity on support for redistribution may be more evident in more socially unequal societies. An interesting finding is that SES was not significant in explaining support for redistribution among Korean people. In South Korea, social welfare has been a major policy agenda since the 2000s and the public has become more generous about government intervention. The evidence confirms 'classlessness' in the welfare attitudes of Korean people (Ahn, 2009; Kim & Yeo, 2011; Ryu, 2004) . More research is needed regarding public support for redistributive social policy in the context of East Asia. Clear development of an understanding of the factors that explain attitudes towards redistribution is an essential step in a meaningful progression towards welfare states.
